CVE-2026-54541
Nimiq is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Prior to 1.6.0, a malicious …
Nimiq is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Prior to 1.6.0, a malicious state-sync peer can crash a syncing node by sending a crafted TrieChunk proof containing two TrieProofNode values with identical keys. TrieProof::verify calls TrieProofNode::child_index in primitives/src/trie/trie_proof_node.rs, where is_prefix_of accepts equal keys and KeyNibbles::get is called at the key length, returns None, and is unconditionally unwrapped. Untrusted ResponseChunk data reaches commit_chunks, put_chunk, and proof.verify before cryptographic proof validation, so the attacker does not need a valid proof. Exploitation requires the attacker to be selected as the victim's sync peer during state sync, and the resulting panic is transient because the node restarts and resynchronizes. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.0.
Why it matters
- ▸ Remotely exploitable over the network — no physical or local access required
- ▸ High attack complexity — exploitation requires specific conditions
- ▸ No authentication required
- ▸ No user interaction needed — can be exploited automatically
Apply the vendor patch as soon as it's available or already released.
This analysis is generated from structured CVSS vector data, CISA KEV cross-referencing, and vendor/product category rules — not a manual expert review. Treat it as a starting point, not a substitute for your own assessment.
CVSS Vector Breakdown
EU Vulnerability Database (ENISA)
EUVD is ENISA's EU vulnerability database, still in beta. EPSS is a probabilistic exploitation-likelihood score, not a certainty.
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